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AFFORDING DISCRETION TO 
IMMIGRATION JUDGES: A COMPARISON 
OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
Adam Collicelli* 
Abstract: In the United States, immigration judges lack the discretion 
to consider defenses during the removal proceedings of legal, non-
citizen residents if they have committed an aggravated felony. American 
citizen children face the significant risk of lifelong separation from par-
ents, who commit relatively minor crimes, because the definition of an 
aggravated felony is so broad. Canadian immigration laws, akin to those 
in a majority of developed countries, grant judges the crucial opportu-
nity to weigh the separation of a parent and citizen child in the removal 
decision. This Note argues that Congress should follow Canada’s exam-
ple by passing the proposed Child Citizen Protection Act. Such an equi-
table approach is necessary to adhere to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. Although the United States is not a party to that Conven-
tion, its duty as a signatory may still require it to promote the best inter-
ests of citizen children in its immigration courts. Further, the principles 
governing that Convention may be morphing into an international cus-
tom, which would place American removal proceedings directly at odds 
with binding international law. 
Introduction 
 Mario Pacheco, a native of Mexico, became a legal permanent 
resident (LPR) of the United States in 1981 when he was only two 
months old.1 In the twenty-four years that he lived on U.S. soil, Mario 
obtained a general equivalency diploma, worked sixty hour weeks in 
the shipping department of a warehouse, and cared for his three U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
* Adam Collicelli is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. The author would like to thank Rachel Rosenbloom for her inspiration and guid-
ance. 
1 See Human Rights Watch, Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants 
Harmed by United States Deportation Policy 21 (2007), available at http://hrw.org/ 
reports/2007/us0707/us0707web.pdf; Stacie Williams, One Strike, You’re Out, Chicago 
Rep., July/Aug. 2005, at 23. 
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citizen children.2 Presently, he faces removal (deportation) for posses-
sion of 2.5 grams of marijuana with intent to distribute, a state mis-
demeanor but an aggravated felony under immigration law.3 Stunned 
at the severe repercussions for his son’s relatively minor offense, 
which occurred when he was only nineteen, Mario’s mother stated, 
“[h]e’s being punished for something he did when he was a teenager. 
He didn’t even go to jail.”4 His young children now may live their lives 
without a father.5 According to current U.S. law, judges have no dis-
cretion to weigh Mario’s meager criminality against the life-altering 
consequences of separating him from his children.6 
 Mihailo Krusarouski, originally from the former Yugoslavia, moved 
to Canada at the age of thirteen.7 Between 1971 and 1995, Mihailo had 
accrued thirty criminal convictions, including assault, breaking and en-
tering, and impaired driving.8 Canada’s Immigration and Refugee 
Board Appeal Division (IRBAD) determined that Mihailo’s subsequent 
removal order was legally valid.9 In exercising its discretionary jurisdic-
tion,10 however, IRBAD determined that Mihailo should not be re-
moved.11 This decision was based heavily upon the best interests of his 
baby daughter.12 To help ensure that the baby was raised by both of her 
parents, IRBAD stayed the execution of the removal order conditioned 
upon Mihailo’s personal rehabilitation.13 
  The startling contrast between Mario’s and Mihailo’s stories serves 
to showcase a very distressing distinction between U.S. and Canadian 
immigration laws.14 Though Canadian law has, since 2002, become 
more restrictive, discretionary review of removal orders by IRBAD re-
mains available for a wide range of lesser criminals if they are LPRs.15 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 21. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. 
6See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§§ 321–322, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(a),(d), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
7 Krusarouski v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2001] I.A.D. T99-04248, 
available at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/decisions. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See Immigration Act, R.S.C., § 70(1)(b) (1985) (repealed 2001) (Can.). 
11 See Krusarouski, I.A.D. T99-04248. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id.; Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 21. 
15 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., §§ 63(3), 64(1) (2001) (Can.). 
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This legal procedure is not an anomaly.16 In fact, the lack of discretion 
available to U.S. immigration judges to consider defenses to deporta-
tion made by LPRs convicted of an aggravated felony puts this country 
in a clear minority among industrialized states.17 Though there are cer-
tainly situations where the removal of an LPR is appropriate, as with 
very violent criminal offenders, the U.S. immigration system’s current 
rigidity eliminates any possibility of equitable treatment for those resi-
dents who clearly deserve it.18 
 Part I of this Note provides a brief survey of the current state of 
immigration law that governs the growing population of LPRs in the 
United States. Part II focuses on current U.S. immigration laws that 
have the capability of rendering such residents, with relatively minor 
criminal convictions, removable without any discretionary examina-
tion of mitigating factors. In particular, this Note examines the com-
pelling factor of a citizen child’s best interests. Next, it discusses the 
discretionary jurisdiction of the Canadian immigration system and its 
source in international law, which is, in part, its ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Finally, Part III argues 
that passage of the Child Citizen Protection Act (CCPA),19 which was 
recently proposed in the House of Representatives, is in line with the 
international legal standards found in the CRC and represents one 
remedy for this serious injustice of U.S. immigration law. 
I. Background 
 Between the years 1997 and 2005, over 600,000 non-citizens have 
been removed from the United States due to criminal convictions.20 In 
2002 alone, the number of criminal deportees surpassed the total of 
those between 1905 and 1986.21 The numbers of this type of removal 
have continually risen in the last decade, springing from 51,874 in 1997 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 49–50. 
17 See id. 
18 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) 
(2000); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(a),(d). 
19 H.R. 1176, 110th Cong. (2007). Representative Serrano introduced an almost iden-
tical bill in Congress in 2006. H.R. 5035, 109th Cong. (2006). 
20 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2005, at 
97–124 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/yearbook. 
shtm. 
21 Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Neces-
sity, 3 Stan. J. Civ. Rts & Civ. Liberties 195, 204 (2007). 
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to 90,426 in 2005.22 Of those removed in 2005, it is estimated that 
around 80,000 were LPRs.23 
 In 2005, 64.6% of the removals for criminal convictions were based 
on non-violent offenses, 20.9% on violent offenses, and 14.7% on 
“other” undisclosed crimes.24 The most common crimes leading to re-
moval involve drugs, non-sexual assault, and the amorphous group of 
“other” offenses.25 Though this latter category is somewhat mysterious, 
stories of deportations for minor offenses have been far from uncom-
mon in recent years.26 
 Besides having obvious negative effects on the deportees, these 
removals have particularly distressing consequences on families.27 Since 
1997, approximately 1.6 million husbands, wives, sons, and daughters 
have been separated from family members because of this process.28 
The separation may be legally enforced, as in cases where the U.S. citi-
zen child is not accepted into the country to which the parent is re-
moved.29 More often, however, the family division results from the par-
ent’s desire to leave the child in the United States to enjoy better living 
standards, education, and job opportunities.30 
 The removal of Gerardo Antonio Mosquera, an LPR in the United 
States for thirty years, depicts one tragic consequence of this all-too-
common occurrence.31 Mosquera was removed after selling ten dollars 
worth of marijuana to a police informant.32 His wife and children, all 
U.S. citizens, were left to fend for themselves.33 Mosquera’s seventeen 
                                                                                                                      
22 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 38. 
23 See Kanstroom, supra note 21, at 196 (noting that though the government does not 
disclose how many of those removed were LPRs, as opposed to illegal border-crossers, the 
figure can be estimated). 
24 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
25 Id. at 42. 
26 See, e.g., Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets—Immigration Law’s 
New Aggravated Felons, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 589, 591 (1998); Melissa Cook, Note, Banished 
for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a 
Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. Third World L.J. 293, 307 (2003) (finding that an LPR 
convicted of shoplifting may be deportable). 
27 See Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 
21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 213, 213–14 (2003). 
28 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 44. 
29 Emile Schepers, Immigrants Fight for Family Values, People’s Weekly World Newspa-
per, July 26, 2007, available at www.pww.org/article/articleview/11484. 
30 See id. 
31 See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Senseless Deportations, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 2007, at B7. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
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year old son, unable to cope with the loss of his father, committed sui-
cide.34 
 The immigration laws of many countries provide for judicial discre-
tion in removal proceedings, helping to alleviate the sometimes unjust 
and often devastating consequences associated with mandatory deporta-
tions due to criminal convictions.35 Human Rights Watch reported that 
sixty-one governments currently allow LPRs to present defenses prior to 
deportation.36 Forty-six of those states do so because they are a party to 
the European Convention of Human Rights.37 Twenty-four governments 
allow family-related defenses as part of their domestic law.38 
 Canadian domestic law currently provides discretion to impartial 
immigration judges to consider family ties prior to removal.39 Even 
though this discretion has been restricted in recent years, LPRs that are 
not “serious criminal[s]”40 may appeal removal orders and the judges 
must weigh “humanitarian and compassionate considerations” includ-
ing “the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision.”41 The 
United States, on the other hand, provides absolutely no discretion for 
the broad spectrum of LPRs that are designated as aggravated felons.42 
 Representative Jose Serrano (D--NY) recently sponsored the 
CCPA in an effort to provide U.S. immigration judges with the oppor-
tunity to employ at least some discretion in such cases.43 The bill 
would amend § 240(c)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
allow immigration judges to weigh the execution of a removal order 
against the best interests of the child when faced with the possibility of 
separating a non-citizen parent from a U.S. citizen child.44 Serrano’s 
bill would supply this discretionary jurisdiction broadly to cases involv-
                                                                                                                      
34 See id. 
35 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 49–50; Yuval Merin, The Right to Family 
Life and Civil Marriage under International Law and Its Implementation in the State of Israel, 28 
B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 79, 79–80 (2005) (noting how international law has long rec-
ognized and protected the family unit for the crucial role it has in human society). 
36 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 49–50. 
37 Id.; see also Merin, supra note 35, at 122. 
38 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 49–50. 
39 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., §§ 67(1), 69(2); Baker v. Canada, 
[1999] S.C.R. 1124. 
40 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 64. 
41 Id. § 69(2). 
42 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) 
(2000); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(a),(d), 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
43 See H.R. 1176, 110th Cong. (2007); Schepers, supra note 29. 
44 See H.R. 1176. 
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ing any “alien” parent, even undocumented residents.45 The CCPA is 
presently under consideration in the House of Representatives, but 
has not made any progress since it was referred to an immigration 
subcommittee in March 2007.46 
II. Discussion 
A. Current U.S. Laws & Rationales Behind Those Laws 
 The U.S. government has always held and utilized the power to 
remove any non-citizen as an inherent part of its sovereignty.47 Re-
moval, however, was not a common procedure in the nation’s first cen-
tury and was reserved for those that posed a serious threat to society.48 
Instead, most legislation focused on controlling entry into the United 
States.49 
 In 1952, the McCarran-Walter Act developed much of the proce-
dures governing deportations that exist in current immigration law.50 
Until 1990, the § 212(c) waiver was in place, which allowed LPRs con-
victed of a crime the ability to provide defenses to deportation, includ-
ing the negative impact on a child, before an immigration judge.51 This 
discretion to weigh family unity into a removal proceeding was available 
to any LPR who had resided in the United States for at least seven 
years.52 
 In the past decade, however, as the number of immigrants has 
risen53 and the threat of terrorist attacks has increased, the executive 
branch has begun using its power to remove non-citizens more fre-
quently and boldly.54 This newly invigorated removal power was made 
                                                                                                                      
45 See id. This bill only restricts discretion in removal proceedings for cases involving 
criminal convictions based on threats to national security or sex trafficking. Id. 
46See id.; Press Release, Jose E. Serrano, U.S. Congressman, Would Judges Prefer to 
Consider the Welfare of Children in Deportation Cases? (Mar. 21, 2007), http://serrano. 
house.gov/PressRelease.aspx?NewsID=1399. 
47 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generally Edward Prince Hutchinson, Legisla-
tive History of American Immigration Policy 1798–1965 (1981). 
48 See Hutchinson, supra note 47, at 12–13; Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 
10. 
49 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 10. 
50 See id. 
51 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(1988) (repealed 
1996). 
52 See id. 
53 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 2006 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 5 
(2007) (stating that 1,266,264 LPRs entered the United States in 2006). 
54 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 16. 
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possible by legislation that was adopted, in large measure, to defend the 
nation from terrorism.55 In his signing statement for one such piece of 
legislation, President William J. Clinton warned against the loose con-
nection between terrorism and LPRs with criminal convictions: “This 
bill . . . makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigra-
tion laws having nothing to do with fighting terrorism. These provisions 
eliminate most remedial relief for long-term residents.”56 
 The president’s signing statement was in reference to the first of 
two remarkably powerful immigration bills passed by Congress in 
1996.57 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
broadened the list of criminal convictions that would designate a non-
citizen as an “aggravated felon”58 and thus subject to removal.59 The 
seventeen new crimes included forgery, bribery, obstruction of justice, 
and certain offenses relating to gambling and prostitution.60 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals has shown its willingness to designate a 
broad array of criminal offenses as aggravated felonies.61 As a result, 
certain misdemeanor offenses under state law have been construed as 
aggravated felonies under the federal statute.62 
 Also in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which lowered the term of im-
prisonment required to become an aggravated felon from five years to 
only one year.63 In addition, section 322(a)(1)(B) of IIRIRA construes 
even one-year convictions with suspended sentences as aggravated felo-
nies.64 Therefore, immigration judges cannot recognize lenient judg-
                                                                                                                      
55 See id. at 17–18. 
56 William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 32 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 720 (Apr. 24, 1996). 
57 See id. 
58 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43). There are other criminal offenses 
besides aggravated felonies that render non-citizens deportable, such as crimes of moral 
turpitude and failure to register as a sex offender. See Immigration and Nationality Act 
§ 237(a)(2). 
59 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii); Anti-Terrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
60 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(e). 
61 See Mary E. Kramer, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity: A Guide 
to Representing Foreign-Born Defendants 162 (2005). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 2002); Human 
Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that Mario was only a misdemeanor offender 
under Illinois law); see also Kramer, supra note 61, at 162. 
63 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43); Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
64 See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 322(a)(1)(B). 
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ments handed out in criminal court that allow lesser criminal offenders 
the opportunity to serve probation instead of time in prison.65 
 Moreover, AEDPA specifically prevents immigration judges from 
allowing § 212(c) waivers for any aggravated felons, not just those with 
at least five-year imprisonments, as was practiced previously.66 Without 
the ability to file a § 212(c) waiver, a staggering amount of LPRs are fac-
ing mandatory removal proceedings for an increasingly wide array of 
relatively minor offenses.67 Immigration judges simply do not have the 
ability to provide any discretionary relief in such cases.68 Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy (D--MA) predicted the repercussions of these broad 
laws: “An immigrant with an American citizen wife and children sen-
tenced to one year of probation for minor tax evasion and fraud would 
be subject to this procedure. And under this provision, he would be 
treated the same as ax murderers and drug lords.”69 
B. Current Canadian Approach in Relation to the CRC 
 Until 2002, the Canadian Immigration Act allowed LPRs broad 
access to petition for relief following a removal order.70 The current 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) restricts discretionary 
appeals to lesser criminals, effectively eliminating the discretion pro-
vided for “serious criminals” who had been punished with two years in 
prison.71 
 Though the candidate pool for discretionary relief has decreased, 
the process remains largely the same.72 The petitions may be brought 
before the IRBAD, which possess discretionary jurisdiction and an obli-
gation to examine “humanitarian and compassionate” considerations.73 
Canadian law requires that immigration judges at this stage examine all 
of the relevant circumstances of the case to determine whether a de-
portation should occur.74 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id.; Cook, supra note 26, at 308–09. 
66 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(a), (d), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
67 See generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 3–83. 
68 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(a), (d). 
69 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
70 See Immigration Act, R.S.C. § 70(1)(b) (1985) (repealed 2001). 
71 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., § 64(1) (2001). 
72 See id. § 63(3). 
73 See id. § 67(1)(c). 
74 See id. § 69(2). 
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 In Ribic v. Canada, a twenty-six-year-old citizen of Yugoslavia le-
gally entered Canada in 1983 to marry Janez Solar.75 The marriage, 
however, never occurred and Ribic found herself in violation of im-
migration law and removable.76 The IRBAD then laid out the differ-
ent types of factors that immigration judges must weigh in employing 
“equitable jurisdiction” with regard to all the circumstances of the 
case.77 These include the seriousness of the offense that led to the 
removal order, the likelihood of rehabilitation, length of time spent 
living in Canada, family ties in Canada, and negative impact on the 
family that the removal would cause.78 
 The family unit factor is most pertinent for the purpose of this Note. 
The Canadian Supreme Court, in Baker v. Canada, reviewed a removal 
order faced by a woman with dependent Canadian citizen children.79 
The Court decided, in part, that the Appeal Division judge should con-
sider the effects of a removal on a family: “[F]or the exercise of the dis-
cretion to fall within the standard of reasonableness, the decision-maker 
should consider children’s best interests as an important factor, give sub-
stantial weight, and be alert, alive and sensitive to them.”80 
 One important rationale given in Baker for emphasizing the im-
portance of this discretionary judgment in appeals to removal orders is 
Canada’s ratification of the CRC.81 The Court adopted the values and 
objectives of this treaty as a part of Canadian domestic law despite the 
fact that it has not been implemented by Parliament and is not legally 
binding.82 The Court reasoned that international law, “both customary 
and conventional,” must be reflected when possible in the interpreta-
tion of Canadian legislation.83 
C. The United States and the CRC 
 The CRC entered into force on September 2, 1990.84 The rele-
vant provisions in the CRC are Articles 3 and 9.85 Article 3 establishes 
                                                                                                                      
75 Ribic v. Canada, [1986] I.A.B.D. No. 4 ¶ 9. 
76 Id. ¶¶ 1, 10. 
77 Id. ¶ 14. 
78 See id. 
79 Baker v. Canada, [1999] S.C.R. 1124 ¶ 2–3. 
80 Id. ¶ 75. 
81 See id. ¶¶ 69–71. 
82 See id. 
83 Id. ¶ 70. 
84 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after CRC]. 
85 See id. arts. 3, 9. 
124 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:115 
that all courts of law, legislatures, and administrative agencies should 
act with the “best interests of the child” as a primary concern.86 In Ar-
ticle 9, separation of a child from his or her parents can only occur 
after judicial review that is attentive to the child’s best interests.87 
 Though a whopping 192 states are parties to the CRC, the United 
States and Somalia remain the only two states that still have not rati-
fied it.88 Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine 
Albright signed the CRC in February 1995.89 President Clinton, how-
ever, never submitted the document to the Senate for ratification and 
the administration of President George W. Bush has expressed its 
clear opposition to the treaty.90 
III. Analysis 
 The United States should adopt a more discretionary approach, 
allowing immigration judges to weigh such factors as family unity be-
fore removing LPRs, like the procedure employed under the Cana-
dian IRPA.91 In fact, there may be an obligation to take such action, 
derived from the nation’s duty as a signatory to the CRC and possibly 
even under a nascent international custom that the CRC may now 
embody.92 The CCPA currently before Congress represents a good 
first step toward both sustaining the overall purpose of the CRC and 
supplying the more equitable judicial review that is provided not only 
by Canada, but by numerous other States.93 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. art. 3, para. 1. 
87 Id. art. 9, para. 1. 
88See CRC, supra note 84, Status of Ratifications; see generally UNICEF, Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last visited Sept. 
28, 2008) (stating that the CRC is the most widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty in 
history). 
89 See Office of the Press Secretary, White House Statement on U.S. Decision to Sign U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Feb. 10, 1995), http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/ar- 
chives/whitehouse-papers/1995/Feb/1995-02-10-us-to-sign-un-convention-on-rights-of-child. 
text. 
90 See Canadian Children’s Rights Council, The United States and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (last visited Sept. 28, 2008), http:// 
www.canadiancrc.com/UN_CRC/UN_CRC.aspx; Mary Jo Anderson, Bush Team Signals New 
U.N. Direction, WorldNetDaily, Feb. 2, 2001, http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTI- 
CLE_ID=21590. 
91 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., § 64(1) (2001). 
92 See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 27, at 229–30; see also Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 1, at 46–47 (arguing for a more discretionary approach based on sources of interna-
tional law other than the CRC, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights). 
93 See H.R. 1176, 110th Cong. (2007); Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 49. 
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 The legislative aim of the 1996 immigration reform in the United 
States was similar to the 2002 reform in Canada: to make it easier for 
non-citizens with serious criminal convictions to be removed from the 
country.94 Canada maintained an important balance in providing dis-
cretionary review for lesser criminals and only eliminating it for seri-
ous offenders.95 The IRPA restricts the review of removal orders for 
“serious” criminal offenders, who were punished with a term of im-
prisonment of two years or more.96 A similar measure in the United 
States, ensuring that § 212(c) waivers are only eliminated for very se-
rious criminal offenders, is a feasible option.97 
 The United States, however, has simply gone too far in its attempt 
to reach an otherwise laudable national security goal.98 With such an 
expansive list of crimes now designated as aggravated felonies, the need 
for judicial discretion is dire.99 In the absence of any discretion, the 
many LPRs in the United States that have lived here since infancy are 
treated the same as immigrants that have only recently arrived.100 Simi-
larly, a rapist or a murderer receives the same immigration penalty as a 
mother convicted of stealing baby clothes that cost $14.99.101 In situa-
tions where lesser offenders are parents, the need for some sort of bal-
ancing approach becomes even more apparent.102 Considering a citi-
zen child’s interests in this process would provide the children of such 
offenders with some hope of avoiding potentially permanent separa-
tion from their parents.103 Under the CRC, this type of balancing ap-
proach would be necessary as immigration courts are required to take 
the child’s best interests as a “primary consideration.”104 
 The U.S. government refuses to ratify the CRC, stifling the family 
unity factor in removal proceedings, because of religious and political 
                                                                                                                      
94 See David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Habeas 
Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 75, 86 (2006–07). 
95 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 64(1). 
96 Id. 
97 See id.; Kanstroom, supra note 21, at 227–31. 
98 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); Human 
Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 18–22. 
99 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
100 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c); Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, 
at 25–26. 
101 See Eric Rich, Deportations Soar Under Rigid Law, Hartford Courant, Oct. 8, 2000, 
at A1. 
102 See David Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 
Nev. L.J. 1165, 1213–14 (2006). 
103 See Rosenbloom, supra note 31. 
104 CRC, supra note 84, art. 3, para. 1. 
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pressure that stems from a fear of excessive government involvement 
in the parent-child relationship.105 There is a concern that ratification 
would delegate parental control to an international authority and 
weaken parents’ rights.106 Also, the CRC directly conflicts with U.S. 
law by banning the death penalty for juveniles.107 Yet, the United 
States could simply make reservations to the CRC, as many other na-
tions have done,108 in order to ratify the core of the treaty.109 Many of 
President Bush’s hesitations relate to provisions outside of Articles 3 
and 9, which are most relevant for removal proceedings.110 Still, the 
United States has not made reservations and instead refuses to ratify 
the treaty altogether.111 
 Even though the United States has not ratified the CRC, its signa-
ture on this treaty still provides some attenuated responsibilities under 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.112 In par-
ticular, the United States is obliged to “refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.”113 The broad language of 
Article 3 suggests that a “best interests of the child” standard encom-
passes even actions where children are only indirectly involved.114 In 
this way, non-discretionary and potentially permanent separation of a 
parent from a child by an immigration court defies an objective of the 
CRC.115 
 In addition, a universal norm preserving family unity may even-
tually become customary international law, placing a direct obligation 
on the United States to weigh the needs of children into removal pro-
ceedings despite its refusal to ratify the CRC.116 The emergence of this 
custom is supported by the development of the “best interests of the 
child” standard into a “ubiquitous feature of international institu-
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tions.”117 Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has noted 
that extremely widespread participation in a treaty may itself suffi-
ciently establish a customary law.118 As 192 States (all but the United 
States and Somalia) have ratified the CRC, a new international cus-
tom may already exist, legally binding the United States.119 
 Canadian cases such as Naidu v. Canada show that a discretionary 
approach in removal proceedings does not provide unlimited support 
to any person with a citizen child.120 There, a Canadian LPR was de-
ported based on a 2001 conviction for trafficking cocaine.121 Naidu, 
however, utilized his ability to appeal this decision before the Immigra-
tion Appeal Division in 2003.122 The Appeal Division stayed Naidu’s 
removal order based on the best interests of his son, with the condition 
that Naidu maintain a clean criminal record in the future.123 By impos-
ing this condition, minor offenders, now fully cognizant of the conse-
quences of their behavior, can remain in Canada to care for their chil-
dren if they avoid further trouble with the law.124 Naidu continued his 
criminal behavior, however, and now faces an arguably more deserved 
removal where the needs of his son will likely not rescue him.125 
 To provide a similar discretionary approach, the U.S. Congress 
should adopt Representative Serrano’s proposed CCPA in adherence 
with the international legal standards that are already in place and 
those that continue to evolve.126 This legislation would ensure that im-
migration judges do not have their hands completely tied in removal 
proceedings that significantly affect a U.S. citizen child.127 If necessary 
to ensure passage, the bill should be amended to apply discretionary 
jurisdiction only to LPR parents, instead of to the much broader group 
of all legal and illegal non-citizens.128 
 The CCPA would not create an automatic safety net for all non-
citizen parents facing removal.129 An impartial immigration judge 
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would make the final decision with full knowledge of the facts.130 Even 
in Canada, where commitment to the CRC led to wide discretionary 
jurisdiction, the mere existence of a citizen child will not always prevent 
a parent’s removal.131 Thus, in Baker v. Canada, the Canadian Court 
concluded that the child’s best interests must not necessarily be the 
strongest of all considerations to be weighed by the decision-maker, but 
must certainly be one such consideration.132 In the same way, the CCPA 
would include the child’s best interests as one equitable factor in the 
judicial review of a removal order, allowing for at least some opportu-
nity to offer a defense in the face of this colossal penalty.133 
Conclusion 
 Canada’s immigration law, in line with international norms, pro-
vides discretion to immigration judges in removal proceedings, better 
securing family unity for LPRs. New restrictions associated with the 
IRPA ensure that discretionary relief be granted to only lesser crimi-
nals. For the LPRs able to appeal their removal orders, the effect of a 
parent’s removal on a Canadian citizen child must be considered, in 
part, due to Canada’s adherence to the CRC. 
 The United States, though not a party to this treaty, should none-
theless take on the responsibilities associated with the international 
custom that the CRC now embodies or soon will represent. The injus-
tices leveled upon long-term LPRs that stem from a decade of harsh 
legislation need to be tempered. Perhaps the best hope to make quick 
progress toward this end is to focus initially on the numerous U.S. 
citizen children that are being immeasurably harmed by current im-
migration laws. Accordingly, Congress should closely deliberate over 
Congressman Serrano’s proposed CCPA, which represents a real op-
portunity to adopt a removal procedure similar to the sensible ap-
proach taken by our northern neighbor. 
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